ULSTER MUST HAVE A CONCRETE GUARANTEE
The Ulster people will not
tolerate indefinitely Heath-Whitelaw direct rule of their region. They
see it as a temporary device to allow time in which to work out a
permanent constitutional arrangement. Further, they will accept only an
arrangement which will be a permanent, concrete guarantee that the
region will remain British. Verbal guarantees whether by individuals, or
the Westminster parliament, or international organisations do not
interest them.
Ulster has a Sudeten problem. The Irish minority plays a
role identical to that played by the German Sudeten minority and the
expansionist Irish Republic a role similar to that played by
expansionist pre-World War II Germany. The Ulster people are in the
post-Munich situation of the Czechs. They have been betrayed and
humiliated and know that a large section of the mainland politicians are
keen to purchase "peace in our tine" either by immediate or
eventual secession of the region to the Irish Republic.
CALMNESS OF STRENGTH
The Ulster people are aware of their numerical
strength and are confident that in the last resort it is they who will
decide the destiny of the region. This .is the key to their remarkable
calm during recent months despite the arrogance, incompetence and
indifference of direct rule; the bloodshed and destruction of the IRA
terrorists and the mediocrity of the majority of Ulster politicians.
An
additional factor in their stolid confidence has been the development of
the early community vigilante groups into the paramilitary Ulster
Defence Association, Loyalist Defence Volunteers and one or two .smaller
organisations. They have their own signals, police and riot control
units and outnumber the British army in Ulster by about three to one.
They have endeavoured to support the anti-IRA activities of the army
where possible and have received a limited amount of training from army
personnel acting surreptitiously during leaves and off-duty hours. No
London government dare ignore them and the Ulster people know it. By
skilful, patient pressures these organisations forced the Heath-Whitelaw
administration to occupy the IRA "no go areas" and to mount
the subsequent military offensive against the IRA gunmen and bombers.
HEATH DOES NOT INTEND A CONCRETE GUARANTEE
However, the patience of
the Ulster people is not inexhaustible. They will tolerate much provided
that in the end they receive a permanent, concrete guarantee that the
region will remain British for all time. The present indication is that
the British Government does not intend to give them such a guarantee,
but will endeavour to palm them off with the kind of verbal assurance
which they have already received from earlier Westminster governments
plus a political horse trader type compromise constitution designed
partly to appease the "Sudeten" minority. Once this fact is
realised by the Ulster public, the confidence which has made for so much
stoic patience could become the irresistible driving force in a reaction
that may result in the region opting for independent dominion status
within the Commonwealth.
THREE CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
Constitutional experts have long pointed
out that a permanent constitutional arrangement for Ulster is limited to
three choices and to three only.
CHOICE 1. Ulster could be integrated
into the Westminster system on the model of Scotland and Wales. It is a
solution which under normal circumstances would appeal strongly to many
Ulstermen, including the present writer. Even at this late stage it
might be accepted by the region if a miracle could be performed and
confidence restored in the will and integrity of Westminster
administrations. At present it is being put forward by Rev. Dr. Ian
Paisley and a number of others. The Ulster public, however, as a result
of current experiences refuses to accept that complete integration
compatible with a concrete guarantee against betrayal by the Westminster
parliament. Also, the present Westminster government ..as apparently
rejected it completely as a solution although most -n embers of the
Conservative Party could be induced to support it.
CHOICE 2. A federation of the whole of the United Kingdom with
subordinate parliaments for England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster is a
logical, workable solution. Federations have long existed in many
countries, including the United States, Canada and Australia.
Unfortunately no British government would undertake so radical a
reorganisation of the United Kingdom.
CHOICE 3. The third and only
remaining solution is an ,independent Ulster linked to Great Britain
and the other member states of the Commonwealth by a common allegiance
to the Crown. It is a well tried constitutional development. There are
now -thirty-two independent countries in the Commonwealth.
SUBORDINATE PARLIAMENT NOT A SOLUTION
A local parliament for one
region only and subordinate to the Imperial Parliament cannot be a
permanent solution. The great constitutional lawyer, C. V. Dicey.
pointed out this elementary fact to the British prime minister,
William Ewart Gladstone, when he proposed a subordinate parliament for
the whole of Ireland in the latter part of last century. Gladstone's
schemes failed to pass parliament, but subsequent experience in various
parts of the world have since confirmed the soundness of Dicey's view.
In 1920 Ulster was given a Gladstone type regional parliament
subordinate to the Imperial Parliament. A parliament was also created
for southern Ireland -and it was assumed that eventually the :two
parliaments in Ireland would come together in a federal system for the
whole of the island. The British Government of that day set aside the
warnings of the constitutional lawyers and political scientists that the
Ulster arrangement could not be permanent. A permanent arrangement, they
assumed, was not required, but a temporary expedient pending the
emergence of a federation.
The Parliament of Northern Ireland functioned
with considerable success for fifty years. This was not because the
constitutional experts were wrong, but because the Ulster politicians
and people operated their parliament, first and foremost, as an
instrument for continually consolidating the union with Great Britain.
The guiding principle in legislation was "step by step" parity
with legislation on the mainland. Twice in the 1920s significant
confrontations occurred between the Westminster and Stormont Government,
but on both occasions the Westminster Government made a strategic
withdrawal when it realised that its opponent had the Ulster public
behind it. Subsequently the Westminster Government seldom wished or had
cause to express an opinion on Ulster affairs. It was not until 1969
that an unavoidable collision on fundamental policy developed between
them. Once that event occurred the situation predicted by the
constitutional experts rapidly materialised and the days of Stormont
were numbered.
VICHY PERIOD: CONSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
The period from
the Wilson-Callaghan intervention after the Londonderry riots of 1969 to
the imposition of Heath-Whitelaw direct rule in 1972 is the Vichy period
of Ulster history. Every major decision and even routine ones were made
in London, but with the Stormont regime permitting itself to be saddled
publicly with responsibility. One former Stormont cabinet minister
today refers to the period as the time of direct rule by the back door.
When the question of interning terrorists was first raised in the
Stormont cabinet, John Taylor, the outspoken junior minister of Home
Affairs, discovered that the British Ministry of Defence had completed
detailed architectural drawings for the Long Kesh internment camp six
months earlier without consulting a single person in the Ulster
government.
Ulstermen blame the slavish collaboration and obedience of
the Vichy months on the mediocrity and timidity of the Stormont cabinet.
The mediocrity and timidity cannot be denied, but the fundamental
explanation lies in the constitutional arrangement which placed both the
Westminster and Stormont governments in near impossible positions. A
territory cannot be ruled by two governments responsible to different
electorates and with conflicting policies on subjects ranging from the
allocation of council houses to the conduct of foreign relations with a
neighbouring state, the Irish Republic.
FORMULA FOR RE-EMERGENCE OF PRE-DIRECT RULE SITUATION
The Ulster
public has not grasped this basic fact that no government with national
and international responsibilities can allow a subordinate local
government to confront it indefinitely with policies which conflict with
its own. Ulstermen cannot bring themselves to believe that fifty years
of reasonably successful Stormont rule was achieved with a constitution
which was fundamentally defective from the beginning. The Ulster
Unionist Party is typical. It has adopted as official policy the
restoration of what is basically the old Stormont plus more effective
powers over security.
The scheme would require the ending of physical
and propaganda harassments by the IRAs and fellow-travellers;
non-interference in the region from within the Irish Republic; and the
return of the London government to a pre-1969 indifference to Ulster
affairs. Without these improbable conditions, the Unionist scheme is a
formula for the speedy re-emergence of the situation which preceded the
imposition of direct rule. The fact that it has strong support in Ulster
should not be allowed to obscure this vital defect.
HEATH'S INTENDED SOLUTION
It is understood that the Heath
administration has now decided on the main features of the
constitutional settlement which it hopes to impose on Ulster. As has
already been remarked, it is very much a political horse trader type
concoction. However, it does recognise that it is impossible for two
governments to rule a region jointly when sooner or later some of their
policies are bound to be in collision. The weeks of confrontation with
the Stormont Government have driven home that fact. Cabinet members
painfully remember the apprehension with which they browbeat men with
the moral authority of a large Ulster electoral majority and the ability
to precipitate a mass Ulster reaction which would divide every part of
Britain and shatter Heath's own Conservative Party.
"CONFLICT FREE" AREAS OF JURISDICTION
It is understood
that the drafters of the Heath proposals have divided the areas of jurisdiction
of the former Stormont parliament into two categories. In
the first they have included those areas where they considered that
conflict involving the Westminster Government is likely to occur and in
the second they have included the areas where they reckoned such
conflict is improbable. Westminster is to become solely responsible for
the first category. It includes police, local defence forces, courts and
other aspects of security. A regional assembly is to become responsible
for the second category or "conflict free" areas of
jurisdiction. It is to be elected by proportional representation and is
to have various devices for participation in government by the
opposition.
A government dependent upon another for the physical means
of enforcing even its minor decisions and made to share authority with
political opponents will be a weak government and, judging from
precedents elsewhere, a corrupt one. A strong government prospers: a
weak one attracts disasters.
If the drafters of the proposals had seen
malcontents in Ulster cheering at the sight of bomb mangled British
servicemen and Ulster citizens, they would realise that a politically
significant element is not interested in the opportunity to operate
"conflict free" areas of jurisdiction. They would realise also
that such people together with a larger number of less brutalised fellow
travellers are interested only in having the region annexed by the
Irish Republic and would use the proposed local assembly as a new point
of departure with which to discredit British authority and undermine
Ulster confidence.
The concept of "conflict free" areas of
jurisdiction is naive beyond belief. The Sudeten Germans in their
sabotage of the Czech state used with much effect cultural issues such
as which language should be the medium of instruction in schools; which
history should be taught in schools; or which languages should be used
in public services, government offices, street signs, etc. Already in
Ulster one Republican group has demanded that the Ministry of Education
provide a state school with Irish as the language of instruction. Almost
any issue can be used by determined protagonists to provide a pressure
point with which to initiate conflict and tension. Economic and
development issues, for example, are as suitable as cultural as the
experience of Nigeria prior to the Nigerian Civil War demonstrated.
The
Ulster people want a parliament under their own control as a guarantee
that the region will never become part of the Irish Republic. They would
cheerfully forgo having one if they could be persuaded that another form
of guarantee would be more effective. The British Government of 1920
understood this fundamental fact. Until Edward Heath and his colleagues
also understand it, their proposals will continue to be cruelly mischievous. Ulster demands a four square defence system and they offer
a Trojan horse.
DOMINIONHOOD PROBABLE
The fact that Ulster has only three
constitutional choices has been emphasised. The Heath administration has
turned its back on the first choice of complete Ulster integration into
the Westminster system and is totally uninterested in the second choice
of a federal system for the United Kingdom. The prospect is thus real
that Ulster may be forced to opt for the third choice of dominion
status. Until recently such a step would have been profoundly repugnant
to the Ulster public. The patronising complacency, incompetence*, and
unending slaughter and destruction of direct rule is making it less so.
The time has come when responsible Ulstermen must face the probability
of independence and weigh the implications.
*The Provisional IRA began to use nitro
benzene bombs in the first week of July 1972 and immediately the
security forces urged the Whitelaw administration to ban the sale of the
chemical to the public.. The simple regulation to do so was not
completed by Lord Windlesham, the Whitelaw Minister of State for
Northern Ireland, until 8th September and did not come into effect until
22nd September. From 9th July to 21st September 154 persons were killed
by terrorist action. A proportion were the victims of nitro- benzine
explosions. |
WESTMINSTER SUBSIDIES ARE VALUED, BUT . . .
What would be the
economic and social implications of dominion status? Until now the press
and other commentators have assumed that the key to Ulster prosperity is
a continuation of Westminster financial subventions and free access for Ulster products to the
mainland market. Only from the general public have come common sense
queries such as, "What is the value of such prosperity if it leads
to Westminster betrayal and annexation by the economically backward and
politically and socially reactionary Irish Republic?" or "How
did Israel prosper when at independence it had two-fifths of Ulster's
population and little more than a few drought plagued citrus
groves?"
The Westminster financial subventions to the economically
weaker regions of Britain (including Ulster) have not been given in a
niggling spirit, but neither have they been wholly uninterested philanthropy. They have helped to improve conditions in the weaker
regions and to slow the drift of the young and enterprising to southern
Britain. On the other hand, they have been a means of topping up
spending capacity for the benefit of manufacturers in the more
prosperous area. Ulster provides the manufacturers of Great Britain with
an extension of one-and-a-half million consumers to their home market
and there is an unrestricted flow of profits to Great Britain from
numerous mainland-owned enterprises. Also, several other areas of the
United Kingdom receive more financial aid in relation to population than
Ulster.
The financial subventions are substantial sums and much benefit
the Ulster economy. During the year ending 31st March, 1972, they
amounted to an estimated 17% of the public revenue.* Acceptance of
subventions on such a scale forces Ulster to follow mainland economic
and fiscal policies irrespective of whether they suit the needs of the
region. The Selective Employment Tax, for instance, was not justified by
Ulster interests. Most people, however, consider that this objection is
outweighed by the benefits to the economy. More formidable is the
objection that they are part of an equation which includes the political
supremacy over Ulster of a government which lacks the will and integrity
to take the steps necessary to ensure permanent- peace and political
stability in the region. The Government of Northern Ireland has paid
£20 million to victims of IRA terrorism. The sum consists largely of
emergency payments designed to provide relief until claims can be
adjudicated and is no indication of the final sum which will be required
even for injuries and damage sustained to date. Many individuals,
businesses and industries have had serious losses for which. no
compensation can be claimed. Additional social security, welfare,
and hospital costs have been imposed on the social services.
Considerably more important in economic terms, however, is the severe
handicap imposed on Ulster in attracting industrial investment. The
amounts of subventions given by the Westminster Government are known.
The number of industries which have not come to the region and the
number of jobs which have not been created because of the appeasement
policies and lack of will of the same government cannot be known.
If
Westminster subventions ceased, Ulster would respond with new economic
polities and a radically reshaped fiscal system. Priorities would be
laid down and new sources of revenue found. Some groups might experience
hardship, especially during the transitional period, but the majority of
the population would be unlikely to be markedly affected.
A considerable
proportion of the subventions are to the Northern Ireland social
services. The latter would continue much as before. The sums required
would be discovered from sources within the dominion. No western
government would now dare challenge the assumption that it has an
overriding responsibility to ensure the health and welfare of its
citizens from infancy to old age. If economies must be made, they will
be made elsewhere.
The present Westminster subventions have only a
limited bearing on the question of the economic prospects of an
independent dominion of Ulster. The task of the latter would be to
maintain a favourable balance of trade with the world at large and it
would have at its command the instruments of devaluation, tariffs,
political leverage on allies, etc. Several small independent countries,
with resources no greater than Ulster, are surviving comfortably without
financial subventions.
* The figure includes payments to the NI. health and social services
(a major item); NI. National Insurance Fund; Regional Employment Premium
to industry; and Agricultural Remoteness Grant, but excludes
agricultural payments common to farmers .in all areas of the U.K. The
Agricultural Remoteness Grant and agricultural payments to farmers are
to be discontinued as an aspect of U.K. membership of the EEC. |
EEC MEMBERSHIP QUESTION
The question of Ulster independence cannot be
separated from the further question of whether or not the new dominion
would be a member of the European Economic Community. If it were a
member certain consequences would follow: if a non-member a very
different situation arises. The issue is of the utmost importance.
A
majority of the British public is opposed to membership of the EEC. The
region where the majority is largest and the opposition most positive is
Ulster.* It may be largely an instinctive
* An additional consideration with the Ulster public is that, under
the terms for entry .of the United Kingdom to the EEC, continuation of
the Safeguarding of Employment Act has been secured for only seven
years. The Act prevents uncontrolled immigration into Northern Ireland
and is a security against large inflows of Irish immigrants dedicated to
the annexation of the state by the Irish Republic |
reaction, but when the economic implications are examined the
instinct is seen to be remarkably sound. Economists of distinction have
pointed out how membership will seriously damage Britain's industry,
trade and balance of payments. Professor Nicholas Kaldor of the
University of Cambridge, Professor Richard Cooper of Yale University,
and Professor Harry Johnson of the London School of Economics, in
particular, have made devastating attacks on the case for membership.
The movement for EEC membership is an example of one of those plausible
hunches which coming at a particular time have conned enough people for
it to become government policy. Free trade, protection, pre-1914
jingoism, post 1933 appeasement and many another policy has been based
on the same type of hunch with the same contemporary disregard for
supporting evidence.
The United Kingdom is small, highly industrialised
and must export to survive. 78 per cent of exports are to non-EEC
countries and Ulster exports a higher percentage than the rest of
Britain. The Community works on the principle that non-EEC markets are
expendable and of much lesser consequence than the EEC internal one. The
Community is an inward looking, largely selfcontained area with high
costs of living, expensive local raw materials and increasingly high
costs of manufacture. It will function satisfactorily for the present
members because of the common tariff wall against the products of the
rest of the world. Countries like Great Britain or Ulster which have
their main markets on the outside of the tariff wall would find it a
different matter.
EEC STEEL IS AN EXAMPLE
The price of steel influences the whole
economy of a nation and is vital for such industries as heavy
engineering and shipbuilding. EEC steel manufacturing is an example of
how Community internal considerations dominate over economic good sense.
The European Coal and Steel Community controls the coal and steel
industries of member countries. It has long used anti-monopoly powers to
resist the natural tendency of the industry to gravitate into the West
Germany- Benelux-north east France region. Such a development would give
Germany the lion's share, France only one area of steel manufacture and
Italy none.
During the negotiations for British entry into the EEC, a
fierce struggle took place on the future of the British steel industry.
The ECSC initially suggested that the nationalised British Steel
Corporation should be broken into two companies. When fears about
British public opinion thwarted the idea, it concentrated on receiving
assurances that the closures of the older mills would continue and that
BSC plans for expanding steel production from 26 million to 35 million
tons in four years and to 45 million in a further five years would not
be implemented. Edward Heath and his negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, issued
denials at the time, but the story has been confirmed from sources
within both the EEC and Britain, including senior officials of the BSC.
Manipulations to restrict the size and location of steel production in
the EEC may be defended on political grounds, but must result in
expensive steel which in turn means that the Community will be forced to
maintain a permanent tariff to keep out cheaper non-EEC steel and steel
products. Also, the discrepancy in price between EEC and non-EEC steel
Will increase with time as Japanese* and American producers bring ever
larger and more advanced mills into production. It is a fact highly
relevant to Harland and Wolff where 84 per cent by value of current
orders are for customers outside the proposed enlarged EEC.
* At present the ECSC has a voluntary understanding with Japanese
steel producers to restrict exports to the EEC, but the Japanese are
unlikely to continue it indefinitely. |
A PERIPHERAL AREA OF A PERIPHERAL AREA
The rise of the British Empire
has been attributed to the position of Britain on the ocean trade
routes. Today geography continues to be a major influence. Industry has
a tendency to concentrate in specific regions. In Britain it is the
"golden Triangle" of south east and midland England. In
Western Europe it is the region stretching from the Benelux countries
through West Germany and part of France to north Italy.
The greater the
concentration, the more competitive a region becomes. Already Britain's
"golden triangle" is feeling the competition of the larger EEC
industrial heartland to the south. As a member of the EEC Great Britain
would be a peripheral area with the consequent industrial handicaps and
Ulster, if also a member, would be a peripheral area of a peripheral
area.
Michelin, Enkalon, Goodyear, Dupont and other European and
American companies, which have established factories in Ulster, have
done so because the region provided specific advantages for the
particular industry. These ranged from government incentives and
reasonable labour costs to Commonwealth preference for a proportion of
exports. EEC standardisation in taxation, wages, public and social
expenditures, banking, and agricultural prices together with monetary
union and the loss of the ability to revalue a country's currency will
remove Ulster's local advantages one by one and leave the disadvantage
of remoteness from the larger EEC markets.
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
An instructive parallel exists in the
experience of Canadian industry in competition with American. Canadian industry is concentrated between Windsor Ontario and Quebec City and is
on the wrong side of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River water and
wilderness chain in the same way as British industry is on the wrong
side of the English Channel. Canada and the United States were once
joined in a near common market, but economic reality forced Canada
further and further from the concept.
The recent history of the Canadian
motor industry is particularly instructive when one bears in mind that
the Canadian and British industry have similar problems with geography
and smaller home markets than rival manufacturers.
The Canadian industry
is the world's seventh largest manufacturer of motor vehicles. The
American industry, however, produces many times as many vehicles and
prior to 1965 the larger American runs of production meant that vehicles
cost about 10 per cent less to manufacture. Canadian built vehicles sold
in their home market thanks only to Canadian import tariffs. Canadian
subsidiaries of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler built 93 per cent of
Canadian produced vehicles. The parent companies openly admitted that,
but for the Canadian import tariffs, they would close their Canadian
subsidiaries and concentrate production in the lower cost American
plants.
In 1965 the unique Canada-United States Automotive Agreement was
signed. It has been an important stimulus to the Canadian motor industry
and during the debate in Britain on EEC membership was quoted as an
example of the stimulus which the British motor industry could expect
from free trade with EEC countries. The truth is that on the Canadian
side the agreement was based on the premise that unqualified free trade
would be totally disastrous for the Canadian motor industry.
The
agreement provided for the suspension of tariffs on motor vehicles and
parts imported into either country from the other. Equally important the
Canadian Government insisted on laying down minimum quantities of
vehicles which had to be produced by American subsidiaries in Canada as
a condition for the suspension of Canadian tariffs. Thus the American
companies were prevented from closing their Canadian subsidiaries.
Unable to close them, logic dictated that they should be made more
viable and additional production was transferred from American parent
plants. The United States entered into the agreement under the
impression that the provision of minimum floors of production within
Canada was a temporary expedient to cushion the transition to true free
trade. Canada was under no such illusion and has resolutely resisted all
subsequent American pressure to have the provision amended.
BRITISH
MOTOR INDUSTRY AND THE EEC
Subsidiaries of Ford, General Motors and
Chrysler produce 53 per cent of motor vehicles manufactured in Britain.
They also have subsidiaries in the present EEC. Each of the latter is a
larger producer than its counterpart in Britain and has larger runs of
production for most models. They have consistently made profits during
the last few years, but in Britain only the Ford subsidiary has done so.
All three companies are co-ordinating the production and sales of their
EEC and British subsidiaries. Ford established Ford of Europe in 1967.
More recently General Motors took the same step and Chrysler is soon to
follow suit. The concentration of production in the more remunerative
European plants appears inevitable once Britain is a full member of the
EEC and the present British 11 per cent import duty on motor cars is
phased out.
The domestically owned British Leyland Motor Company, which
produces 46 per cent of British vehicles, is under similar pressures to
the American subsidiaries in Britain. As with the latter, the production
runs of BLMC, in the main, are shorter than those of EEC competitors.
Lord Stokes, the chairman, has made bold statements about how EEC
membership will boost the prospects of the company in Britain, but the
forward planners of BLMC are under no such illusions. They are keenly
aware of the advantages of competing from inside Europe rather than from
inside Britain. They have set a target of 450,000 European vehicle sales
for 1975 and plan to produce 300,000 of them in plants in Furope.
TARIFFS CAN BE VITAL
As a member of the EEC Ulster would surrender the right to impose
import and export tariffs and to use devices such as export incentives
to industry. The discussion of the Canadian and British motor industries
has emphasised the importance of tariffs. It is fashionable in some
quarters to be contemptuous of them as reactionary impediments to trade.
Excessive and indiscriminate tariffs are undoubtedly harmful, but when
used judiciously they contribute to economic stability and growth.
Developing countries are particularly indebted to them and the EEC
itself relies on them against the manufacturers of non-member states.
A
modern economy should be a balanced spectrum of interdependent
industries. In unfettered competition an industry need only be a little
uncompetitive to be destroyed. As it dies other industries are weakened
and made less competitive. In the years following World War II, changes
in technology and distribution caused the textile industry in New
England to crumble in the face of competition from the southern American
states. The Canadian textile industry has more natural handicaps than the New England, but
tariffs were amended to protect it. Today Canadian textiles dominate
their home market and have ousted American textiles from those areas of
the Caribbean where they have the small Commonwealth preference. If
Canada had been in an EEC type free trade rela'tionsh'ip with the United
States, she could not have saved her textile industry and, in addition,
the important garment and synthetic fibre industries would have
succumbed with it.
NO ULSTER SYNTHETIC TEXTILE INDUSTRY IF EEC MEMBER
The EEC restrictions on governmental incentives to specific industries
and the narrow confines within which it permits aid to developing areas
would be important for Ulster. During the last number of years a new, predominantly
synthetic textile industry has been established and now is
much more important than the older linen industry. A decisive factor was
the regional development policies implemented by the Government of
Northern Ireland. It was a period of chronic world glut in textiles. EEC
policy permits state aid to developing areas only in industries whose
products are not in surplus. Thus had Ulster been part of the EEC the
new textile industry, which now employs more people than shipbuilding
and aircraft construction combined, would not have come into existence.
KEEP OUT OF EEC AND DEVALUE
Economic considerations would debar
membership of the EEC for a dominion of Ulster*. The instinctive
inclination of the Ulster people would also debar it. How then would
Ulster fare as an independent state outside of the EEC and with Great
Britain a member of it? The answer would appear to be that it would
survive with success and possibly with dynamic success.
A devaluation of
the Ulster pound would enable Ulster manufacturers to compete in EEC
countries, including Great Britain, irrespective of EEC tariffs against
the products of non-member states. No less important, it would enhance
their ability to undercut competition in other areas of the world and
would guard against balance of payments problems. Ulster would continue
to be a member of the sterling block. Imports would cost more as would
foreign holidays, but the gain for industry would more than compensate
and the general standard of living would be satisfactory.
*EEC associated status might be possible for Ulster, but the limited
advantages would have to be weighed against other considerations. |
SOME
STEPS TO BE TAKEN
Import tariffs would be used to give Ulster industry a
stable local market and to encourage the manufacture of a wider range of
goods for local consumption despite the smallness of the local market.
The latter would conserve foreign exchange and absorb surplus labour.
Raw and semi-processed materials required by Ulster industry would be
imported from any part of the world without tariff or quota restriction.
Tax and rent concessions, settlement grants, provision of factories and
the other incentives which the Government of Northern Ireland has long
used to attract industry to the region would be continued with the
addition of others used by independent countries. The latter might
include "free port" facilities for products not manufactured
in Ulster. The drain of revenue from the , region by BEA and' British
Caledonian Airways would be curtailed by the formation of an Ulster
airline and the new dominion would insist on a fair share in the
shipping services to Great Britain. Steps, too, would be taken to ensure
an Ulster owned banking industry.
Companies and individuals,
irrespective of nationality, are interested in profits. As a dominion
Ulster would offer lower production costs than EEC or North American
countries plus other local advantages. The attractiveness would increase
as production costs in Great Britain rise to general EEC levels. In
addition. EEC membership will prevent British manufacturers from
availing themselves of Commonwealth preference, but those in an
independent Ulster would continue to do so.
ULSTER INDUSTRIES AND DOMINION STATUS
The main industries of Ulster
should be able to take independence in their stride. 16 per cent by
value of the current orders of Harland and Wolff are for customers in
the United Kingdom and the remaining 84 per cent for ones outside the
proposed enlarged EEC. 70 per cent of output at Shorts is for foreign
and overseas customers. They include the American companies of Boeing,
Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop and Avco. The company manufactures
the engine pods for the Lockheed TriStar and the wings of the Fokker F28
Fellowship. The missile division supplies equipment to fourteen navies
in addition to the Royal Navy.
The Ulster people would wish to maintain
as close links as possible with Great Britain in trade and industry. A
number of mutually useful arrangements would be possible. A permanent
share in British missile and aerospace contracts, for instance, could be
ensured for Shorts. It would be valuable to the company and would be
welcomed by the Royal Navy and British army which plan to use the Seacat
and Blowpipe missiles until the 1980s.
Ulster would have several strong bargaining positions. It would have
more " disallowance leverage", either to use or to hold in
abeyance, than Malta under Mr. Dom Mintoff. The present market in Ulster
for British products provides the equivalent of full-time employment for
120,000 workers on the mainland. The products of an independent Ulster
outside the EEC would continue to sell in Great Britain because of lower
costs of production, but the products of the latter would have a lean
time in Ulster if part of the market were reserved for local
manufacturers and the remainder thrown open to world competition.
Ulster's recent industrial record is encouraging for the future. In 1971
the index of industrial production rose by 6.7 per cent compared with
0.9 per cent for the United Kingdom. Productivity in all production
industries rose by 10.8 per cent compared with 4.3 per cent in the
United Kingdom and in manufacturing industries by 8.5 per cent with 3.3
per cent in the United Kingdom. About 33 per cent of Gross Domestic
Product went to fixed capital investment compared with about 21 per cent
in the United Kingdom. These results were achieved despite the IRA
terrorist campaign which discouraged industrial investment from outside
the region and damaged the tourist industry. Unemployment in Belfast,
Co. Antrim, and north Co. Down was under 5 per cent. The remainder of
the region brought it up to 8.1 per cent. The latter compared
unfavourably with 2.5 per cent in south east England (3.6 per cent for
all Great Britain), but less so with 10.1 per cent in Port
Glasgow-Greenock.
RECOGNISE REALITY: MAKE THE WORKERS RESPONSIBLE
Industrial relations are better in Ulster than in Great Britain. In
1971 industry on the mainland lost 30% more working days per 1,000
workers through strikes than industry in Ulster. Independence should
increase the discrepancy. Much of the momentum for dominion status
already comes from the shop floors and farms. Industries which
identified with the new dominion would have the staunch loyalty which
has been characteristic of the workers of Israel. In addition a
completely new era in harmonious industrial relations could be secured
by a major innovation. There is no strong wish for the restoration of
the former Stormont senate. It could be replaced by a second chamber
which would consist of representatives of the whole spectrum of Ulster
workers, ranging from unskilled to professional and managerial and
including farmers. Already the nucleus for such a development exists in
the Loyalist Association of Workers which is based on factory
committees.
Modern industrial conflict cannot be resolved by
schoolmaster type "industrial relations acts" whether of the
kind implemented by the Conservative Government or contemplated by the
preceding Labour one. The workers, unskilled to managerial, are now the
dominant power in industry and the solution to industrial conflict is to
give them direct responsibility. They will be keenly aware that the
interests of the industries of the nation coincide with the interests of
the workers and will make certain that they are not injured by
irresponsible policies or unnecessary industrial conflict. Such a step
would have sound historical precedent. When the barons, or knights of
the shire, or industrial middle class emerged as major national forces,
they were eventually given corresponding responsibility within the
system of parliament.
DOMINION STATUS MUST INCLUDE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The British Government
would have no insurmountable difficulty in bringing itself to accept a
dominion of Ulster which respectfully followed it into membership of the
EEC. An Ulster determined to remain outside and with a mind of its own
on foreign affairs would be much less acceptable. The other EEC
countries also would be uneasy at the prospect and would endeavour to
influence the British Government against permitting it. Foremost among
them would be the Irish Republic which, apart from other considerations,
would have the exceptionally difficult task of protecting its high cost
EEC agriculture and industry from massive smuggling from Ulster.
The
London government would probably endeavour to reserve to Great Britain
responsibility for Ulster foreign relations on the model of Gibraltar
and small former colonial territories such as St. Kitts and Nevis. It
would be in -the Ulster tradition of identification with Great Britain
in peace and war and would have a measure of support in the region. The
majority of the Ulster public, however, would be opposed to it in their
present mood. They greatly resent the conduct of relations with the
Irish Republic since the beginning of the present crisis and the failure
of the British Foreign Office to fight the Ulster cause abroad.
Apart
from current Ulster sentiment there are solid reasons why the government
of Great Britain could not be permitted to remain responsible for Ulster
foreign relations. How could the same foreign office represent the
commercial interests of Great Britain and Ulster when they were in
conflict? The Ulster airways, for instance, might wish to secure a route
from a foreign government to the exclusion of BEA or BOAC.
International affairs, and especially international power politics,
are matters which are taken seriously in Ulster. The memory of the cost
which the region paid between the battle of the Somme and November 1918
is still too vivid for it to be otherwise. There is considerable unease
at the Anglo-French nuclear understanding and the drift in foreign
policy away from the United States and Canada. Nor is Ulster likely to
be happy with certain trends which are not yet appreciated by the
public. One is the tendency of France and Britain to see West Germany as
an emerging force which must be restrained and another is the
probability that, as the Anglo-French dominated EEC begins to assert
itself in political and military terms, the Soviet Union in self-defence
will detach West Germany from present alignments by offering
reunification with East Germany. On such issues the Foreign Office could
not represent both Great Britain and Ulster. The latter would have to
have its own Ministry of External Affairs.
POLITICS IS THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
The Commonwealth consists of thirty-two independent states. Many are
poorer than Ulster and some have smaller populations. Apprehensions
existed in each before independence as to the reaction of foreign
controlled industry and capital. Invariably the apprehensions turned out
to be ill founded. On the northern approaches to Europe there is room
for an Ulster-independent, democratic, flexible, imaginative and deeply
British.
Dominion status is a practical, although until now an
unwelcome, alternative for the Ulster people. Edward Heath and his
colleagues must grasp this fundamental fact. It is improbable that they
wish to force one of the most loyal and industrious of the British
peoples out of the United Kingdom. The scheme for an assembly with
"conflict free" areas of jurisdiction must not be allowed to
proceed further. The Ulster people either will repudiate it with
region-wide violence immediately it is made public or with Machiavellian
subtlety will return apt the first election a majority solemnly pledged to declare the assembly unconstitutional and dissolved. In either event
the remaining credibility of the Heath administration in the region
would be shattered and Ulster confidence in the Westminster link further
undermined.
Politics is the art of the possible. A settlement of the
Ulster crisis must be based on a constitution which will function over
the years and it must be acceptable to the Ulster people.